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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Is the plaintiff, Jay Rekward, entitled to temporary total 
disability payments during the course of his vocational 
rehabilitation, even though he has reached a state of medical 
stability? 
II. Is the plaintiff, Jay Rekward, entitled to a higher 
impairment rating based upon the credible evidence, or in the 
alternative, is he entitled to a remand for an evidentiary hearing 
to assess the credibility of the medical opinions? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is brought before the above-entitled court to 
review an Order of the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, 
Workers Compensation Division. 
A hearing was held before an administrative law judge of the 
Industrial Commission on the 10th day of December, 1986. After 
the conclusion of the testimony, the matter was referred to a 
medical panel. An objection to the medical panel report was made 
by Rekward, but was denied in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order entered by the administrative law judge. A motion 
for review was filed with the Industrial Commission, which denied 
the motion. A Petition for Writ of Review was then filed in this 
court. 
The Industrial Commission denied to Rekward temporary total 
disability benefits during the time he is engaged in vocational 
rehabilitation. The Commission then awarded permanent partial 
disability benefits in accordance with the panel report, despite 
conflicting medical opinions and Rekward!s objection to the panel 
report, based on the conflicting opinions. No hearing was held to 
determine the credibility of the opinions. 
FACTS 
Jay Rekward (hereinafter Rekward) was working as a heavy 
equipment operator for the defendant, Howard Foley Company 
(hereinafter Foley), during August of 1983. On the 17th day of 
August, Rekward was involved in an industrial accident when the 
backhoe he was operating rolled three times down the side of 
mountain (R. p.6, 28 - 29). Rekward was taken to the Tooele 
Valley Hospital for emergency treatment (R. p.35) and was 
subsequently seen by a number of doctors. Dr. Jane Squires 
ultimately declared him medically stable as of the 21st day of 
July, 1986 (R. p.74). Her report to the Industrial Commission 
dated November 6, 1986 indicates that Rekward has not been 
released for usual work, but has been released for light work (R. 
p. 74). She has also stated that he cannot return to his former 
occupation (R. p.83). His injuries were described as "neck injury 
with resultant severe DJD in cervical spine, fibrosis in cervical 
muscles with decreased range of motion, pain and headaches.'1 (R. 
p.74). No impairment rating was given, as her employer, the 
Veteran's Adminstration, prohibits the giving of written ratings. 
Rekward was referred to Dr. Robert Baer, to determine an 
impairment rating. Rekward was given a thirty percent (30%) 
impairment rating with an additional five percent \b%) for pain 
(R. p.90 - 91). Foley (through its insurance carrier, Travelers 
Insurance Company) requested an independent evaluation, which was 
performed by Dr. Geoffrey Orme. Dr. Orme found a twenty percent 
(20%) impairment rating to the cervical spine, based upon the 
guidelines established by the American Academy of Orthopaedic 
Surgeons (R. p.178), and a two percent (2%) impairment for 
decreased sensation in the hand based upon the tables for 
unilateral spinal nerve involvement (R. p.178 - 179). Dr. Orme 
stated that Rekward would have difficulty working heavy machinery 
and that he should pursue vigorous rehabilitation (R. p.179). Dr. 
Orme felt that Rekward should be trained at lighter work (R. 
p.179) . 
Rekward testified that his restrictions included sitting for 
two hours, standing for two hours, walking for two hours, lifting 
twenty pounds or less, and bending occasionally (R. p.47). These 
restrictions were based on the advice of Dr. Squires (R. p.81). 
He further testified that the Social Security Administration had 
made a finding that there was no work available in the economy for 
him due to his injuries, and that he was receiving disability 
payments from the Social Security Administration (R. p.47 - 48). 
Rekward has a high school education (R. p.48) and has only 
training and experience as a heavy equipment operator (R. p.49). 
He has tried to find employment, but has been physically incapable 
of doing the work (R. p.49 - 50). 
Following a hearing, Rekward was referred to a medical panel 
for further evaluation (R. p.63, 65). The panel, without 
referring to any guidelines as to how the rating was arrived at, 
found a ten percent (10%) impairment referable to cervical 
spondylosis, ten percent (10%) for depression, one percent (1%) 
for sensory loss in the right hand, and two and one-half percent 
(2.5%) for hearing loss (R. p.212). 
An objection to the medical panel report was timely filed, 
drawing to the attention of the administrative law judge the 
significant differences between the ratings of Dr. Baer, Dr. Orme 
and the medical panel (R. p.224 - 227). It was pointed out that 
Dr. Orme had relied on orthopedic guides in making his ratings, 
while the medical panel had not. No hearing was held following 
the objection to the report. The administrative law judge entered 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, summarily 
dismissing the objections (R. p.228 - 235). A motion for review 
was timely filed, again pointing out the discrepancies between the 
medical reports (R. p.236 - 238). The motion argues that the 
weight of the credible evidence supports a higher rating (R. 
p.237). The Motion further sought an award of temporary total 
disability through the time of Rekward*s vocational rehabilitation 
(R. p.236 - 237). Rekward's Motion was denied and an appeal was 
taken to this court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. REKWARD IS ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY PAYMENTS 
UNTIL HE HAS COMPLETED RETRAINING 
Rekward is incapable of being employed without vocational 
retraining. Since the purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act is 
to provide for compensation until an injured worker is able to 
return to work, Rekward is entitled to temporary total benefits 
until he completes his retraining. This is in harmony with the 
legislative intent, since the legislature has required referral to 
the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, prior to the finding of 
permanent total disability. 
II. REKWARD IS ENTITLED TO A HIGHER IMPAIRMENT RATING 
BASED UPON THE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
A REMAND FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO ASSESS THE 
CREDIBILITY OF THE MEDICAL OPINIONS 
The medical evidence was contradictory as it related to the 
amount of impairment resulting from Rekward's cervical injuries. 
Only Dr. Orme indicated how he reached his opinion, having relied 
on the guidelines of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons. 
Rekward maintains that this report is thus, the most credible. In 
the alternative, Rekward seeks a remand to assess the credibility 
of the medical opinions. Although an objection to the medical 
panel report was made, pointing out the conflicting testimony, no 
hearing was held. Utah law and fundamental fairness require cross 
examination to determine credibility or to otherwise establish 
factual matters. The failure to hold a hearing to allow cross 
examination, when an objection to the panel report has been filed, 
is an abuse of discretion, requiring a remand. 
ARGUMENT 
I. REKWARD IS ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY PAYMENTS 
UNTIL HE HAS COMPLETED RETRAINING 
All of the testimony presented indicates that Rekward cannot 
return to his former occupation as a heavy equipment operator (R. 
p.46 - 50, 74, 83, 118, 179). The independent medical evaluation 
obtained by Foley recommends vigorous rehabilitation and training 
for lighter work (R. p.179). Rekward has a high school education 
and has no training nor experience except as a heavy equipment 
operator (R. p.48 - 49). The Social Security Administration has 
found him totally disabled, there not being any jobs in the 
economy which Rekward is capable of performing (R. p.47 48). He 
has tried to find work, but has not been successful (R. p. 49-
50) . 
This is factually similar to United Park City Mines Company 
vs. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 393 P.2d 800 (1963). In that case, 
a miner was injured in an industrial accident. The injury 
sustained rendered him incapable of returning to work at his 
former occupation. The employer argued he could do lighter work 
and was entitled only to an award of permanent partial disability. 
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding: 
In considering the attack upon the order made, these 
principles ought to be kept in mind: that a worker may be 
found totally disabled if by reason of the disability 
resulting from his injury he cannot perform work of the 
general character he was performing when injured, or any 
other work which a man of his capabilities may be able to do 
or to learn to do; ... 
393 P.2d at 801-802. 
In Marshall vs. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 
1984), a coal miner was injured and was unable to return to mining 
as an occupation. Although his impairment rating was found to be 
only twenty-six percent (26%), he was awarded permanent total 
disability payments because his disability was total, in terms of 
employability. The Supreme Court stated: 
At the outset, we note that the purpose of the Worker's 
Compensation Act is "to secure workmen ... against becoming 
objects of charity, by making reasonable compensation for 
calamities incidental to the employment ..." [citation 
omitted]. This compensation is not in the form of damages 
for injury, as in a tort action, but in the form of payments 
to compensate for the loss of employability resulting from 
the injury, [citation omitted]. Thus, the Utah Worker's 
Compensation Statutes key the amount of the weekly payment 
not merely to the medical nature of the injury, but to a 
percentage of the worker's average weekly wages, reflecting 
the economic impact of the injury on the particular 
individual. (Emphasis in original). 
681 P.2d at 210-211. 
A long line of cases follow these principles that impairment 
and disability are different concepts and a worker may be disabled 
even though his physical impairment may be slight. See Norton vs. 
Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986); Hardman vs. Salt 
Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986); Entwistle 
Company vs. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495 (Utah 1981); Brundage vs. IML 
Freight, Inc., 622 P.2d 790 (Utah 1980); Morrison-Knudson 
Construction Company vs. Industrial Commission, 18 Utah 2d 390, 
424 P.2d 138 (1967) . 
Thus, a worker suffering an industrial injury, who is unable 
to return to his former occupation, should be held to be 
permanently totally disabled. In this case, Rekward, by consensus 
medical opinion, cannot return to his former occupation as a heavy 
equipment operator. Dr. Squires, the treating physician, imposed 
certain restrictions limiting Rekward to sitting for two hours, 
standing for two hours, walking for two hours, occasional bending 
and stooping, and lifting no more than fifteen to twenty pounds 
(R. p.81). Rekward has a high school education and has no 
training nor experience other than as a heavy equipment operator 
(R. p.48 - 49). The Social Security Administration has found 
there is no work he is capable of performing in the economy (R. 
p.47 - 48). The independent evaluation by Dr. Orme indicates 
Rekward can probably be retrained (R. p.179). Indeed, Rekward 
feels he can be retrained and is desirous of being retrained. Ke 
had taken the initiative prior to the hearing, to have himself 
accepted into an Idaho vocational rehabilitation program (R. 
p.24). This is expected to be a two-year program. Until that 
program is completed, it is not known if Rekward can be retrained 
or not. 
Because Rekward is hopeful of being retrained, he had not 
asked for permanent total disability, but has asked that temporary 
total disability continue through his retraining. He should not 
be penalized by his ambitious desire to retrain himself and make 
himself productive. Indeed, Rekward is totally disabled absent 
retraining. However, he is not eligible for total disability 
payments until after a referral to the Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation. Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-67 (1953 as 
amended) provides that permanent total disability cannot be paid 
an employment until after referral to and the employee's 
cooperation with the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. 
Thus, the legislature had in mind a rehabilitation program prior 
to the awarding of total disability payments. Given the purpose 
of the Worker's Compensation Law as set forth in Marshall vs. 
Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1984) "... to 
compensate for the loss of employability ...", the legislative 
intent is best met by allowing temporary total disability payments 
through the retraining mandated by Utah Code Annotated Section 35-
1-67 (1953 as amended). Indeed, the purpose of temporary total 
disability payments is to compensate an injured worker until they 
are able to return to work. In Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 
vs. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617, 619 - 620 (Utah 1977) the Supreme Court 
stated: "said benefits [temporary total] are intended to 
compensate a workman during the period of healing and until he is 
able to return to work ..." At the conclusion of the retraining, 
a determination of permanent total, or permanent partial 
disability may be made. 
The Minnesota Court in Schulte vs. C. H. Peterson 
Construction Company, 278 Minn. 79, 153 N.W.2d 130 (1967) has 
reached this conclusion. In a case involving a 48 year old 
injured worker, with a high school education, unable to return to 
his former occupation, the Supreme Court stated: 
It is well settled that the concept of total disability is 
not a mere reflection of an employee's physical condition. 
Minnesota Statutes 176,101, Subdivision 5, defines "total 
disability" as meaning, among other things, "any other injury 
which totally incapacitates the employee from working at an 
occupation which brings him an income". This court in 
interpreting this language has formulated the rule that a 
person is totally disabled if his physical condition, in 
combination with his age, training and experience, and the 
type of work available in his community, causes him to be 
unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment 
resulting in an insubstantial income. A total disability is 
temporary when it is likely it will exist over a limited 
period of time only. If the inability-to-earn-wages aspect 
of the rule is satisfied, the fact that the injury itself is 
permanent and partial in a physical sense will not preclude a 
determination that the employee has a temporary total 
disability. The concept of temporary total disability is 
primarily dependent upon the employee1s ability to find and 
hold a job, not his physical condition. 
153 N.W.2d at 133-134. 
Although this decision is based on a statute that relates to 
income, the decision is wholely consonant with the purpose of the 
Utah Act, to provide temporary compensation while the employee is 
unable to be employed. In addition, the Utah Statute {Utah Code 
Annotated section 35-1-65) ties compensation to a percentage of 
income. 
In Minshall vs. Plains Manufacturing Company, 215 Neb. 881, 
341 N.W.2d 906 (1983) the injured worker was unable to return to 
his former occupation. He had received some retraining, but was 
not employable, due to his industrial injuries, though he 
attempted to work. He had been given a twenty percent (20%) 
permanent impairment rating by one of his doctors. Nevertheless, 
the court held: 
A workman who is unable to perform or to obtain any 
substantial amount of labor, either in his particular line of 
work or in any other for which he would be fitted except for 
the injury, is totally disabled within the meaning of the 
Workmenfs Compensation Act [citation omitted]. 
341 N.W.2d at 909. 
See also State Ex Real. Home vs. Industrial Commission, 18 
Ohio State 3rd 79, 489 N.E.2d 753 (1985) and Barkdull vs. 
Homestake Mining Company, 317 N.W.2d 417 (S. D. 1982). 
Foley, in responding to Rekward's motion for review, relied 
on Booms vs. Rapp Construction Company, 720 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986). 
In Booms, the injured worker, although stable enough to receive an 
impairment rating, wanted to continue his temporary total payments 
until a specific finding of being able to return to work was made 
by the Industrial Commission. The court ruled, on the facts of 
that case, that temporary total benefits cease when the injury is 
medically stable. This is not necessarily inconsistent with 
Rekward's request, under the facts of this case, in light of the 
statute and case law in interpreting the Worker's Compensation 
Act. In Marshall vs. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 
1984), the injured worker was stable enough to receive an 
impairment rating of twenty-six percent (26%)/ but was found to be 
totally disabled because he could not return to his work. In 
Norton vs. Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986}, the 
injured worker had received a permanent partial impairment rating 
of thirty-one percent (31%), yet was found totally disabled due to 
his inability to return to work. In Brundage vs. IML Freight, 
Inc., 622 P.2d 790 (Utah 1980) the worker received a thirty 
percent (30%) impairment rating, but was found to be totally 
disabled because he could not return to work. The court further 
held, in the absence of contradictory evidence concerning the 
employability of the injured worker, that the employer has the 
burden of proving available work: 
In the face of such evidence, none of which was contradicted, 
it then became incumbent upon the defendants to show that 
plaintiff "is able to secure employment of a special nature 
not generally available or that he is able to perform the 
duties of such employment." {citation omitted} 
622 P.2d at 792. 
Rekward should not be penalized because of his desire to 
return to work, and thus has asked for temporary total, rather 
than permanent total, benefits during his retraining. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court in Entwistle Company vs. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495 (Utah 
1981) observed: 
The law should not and does not encourage indolence by 
requiring that a man be completely idle in order to remain 
eligible for disability compensation. 
626 P.2d at 497. 
Indeed, the legislative intent is to prevent indolence. Utah 
Code Annotated Section 35-1-67 (1953 as amended) requires 
vocational rehabilitation before a permanent total disability is 
found. Thus, an uncontradicted inability to work, despite medical 
stabilization, justifies a payment of temporary total benefits 
through vocational retraining, when the extent of the permanent 
total or permanent partial disability can be better known. 
Thus, the issue of receiving temporary total payments through 
retraining is a distinct issue from that presented in 
Booms. Rekward is entitled to temporary total benefits, in order 
to carry into effect the purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act 
to rehabilitate injured workers and to provide for their financial 
needs until they can be productive following their injuries, and 
to prevent them from being public charges and objects of charity. 
II. REKWARD IS ENTITLED TO A HIGHER IMPAIRMENT RATING 
BASED UPON THE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
A REMAND FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO ASSESS THE CREDIBILITY 
OF THE MEDICAL OPINIONS 
Because Rekward!s treating physician was prohibited from 
making an impairment rating by the Veteranfs Administration 
policies, the three ratings given Rekward were all independent. 
Dr. Baer found a thirty percent (30%) impairment for his cervical 
injuries. Dr. Orme found a twenty percent (20%'} impairment due to 
the cervical injuries, and the medical panel found a ten percent 
(10%) impairment due to the cervical injuries. Only Dr. Orme, of 
the three evaluators, indicated how he calculated the impairment 
rating. Dr. Orme, in determining the cervical impairment, relied 
on the guidelines established by the American Academy of 
Orthopaedic Surgeons (R. p.179). Absent a hearing to assess the 
credibility of the various ratings, Dr. Orme's report must be 
deemed the most credible, as it is the only one setting forth the 
guidelines relied upon. 
The administrative law judge apparently did not hold a 
hearing due to his belief that "so that while at first blush the 
ratings of Dr. Orme and the medical panel would seem inconsistent, 
upon the bigger view, it is clear that both are consistent." (R. 
p.229). This statement was based on the fact that the total 
impairment, as found by the panel is twenty-three percent (23%), 
while the total impairment as found by Dr. Orme, was twenty-two 
percent (22%). However, Dr. Orme did not rate the psychiatric 
injury and the hearing loss, which were rated by the panel. 
Indeed, Dr. Orme could not rate them, as he is not a psychiatrist 
nor an audiologist. Thus, comparing the ratings for the cervical 
injuries, which were rated by both, there is a great disparity 
between the twenty percent (20%) found by Dr. Orme and the ten 
percent (10%) found by the panel. 
In the event this court declines to find Dr. Orme's report 
the most credible, since it is the function of the Industrial 
Commission to be the fact finding body, Rekward is entitled to a 
remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine the credibility of 
the various ratings. Although the objection to the medical panel 
report and a motion for review to the Industrial Commission 
pointed out the disparity of the ratings, and argues the 
credibility of the same (R. p.224 - 227, 236 - 238), no hearing 
was held. Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-82.51 (1953 as 
amended) gives to each party the right to cross examine. The 
pertinent part reads as follows: 
All parties in interest shall have the right to be present at 
any hearing, in person or by attorney or by any other agent, 
and to present such testimony as may be pertinent to the 
controversy before the commission and shall have the right to 
cross examine. 
When Rekward objected to the panel report, setting forth the 
disparities between the various ratings, he was entitled to cross 
examine the various doctors in order to assess and determine the 
credibility of each. Indeed, the opportunity to challenge the 
panel report with conflicting medical opinion was referred to by 
the administrative law judge at the conclusion of the hearing. (R. 
p.68). It is an abuse of discretion to deny a claimant the 
fundamental right of cross examination. 3 Larson, Workmenf s 
Compensation Law (1983) Section 79.63 states: 
Under the increasingly common practice of referral of 
claimants to an official medical examiner or an independent 
physician chosen by the commission, it is particularly 
important that the commissions not lose sight of the 
elementary requirement that the parties be given an 
opportunity to see such doctor1s report, cross examine him, 
and, if necessary, provide rebuttal testimony. 
In Northwest Trailer Sales vs. McCann, 217 S.2d 310 (Florida 
1968), the Florida Supreme Court, in construing a statute similar 
to our own, has stated: 
We find nothing in this statute which authorizes a deputy 
[administrative law judge} to obtain independent medical 
advice by requesting a claimant to submit to a physical 
examination, and then deny to the claimant the right to 
examine or cross examine the doctor. 
217 So.2d at 312. 
Thus, when the credibility of various impairment ratings is 
placed in question before the Industrial Commission, the claimant 
is entitled to a hearing to determine the credibility of each of 
the ratings. The denial of such a fundamental right is an abuse 
of discretion warranting a remand. 
Rekward is entitled to a higher impairment rating based on 
the more credible evidence, or in the alternative, he is entitled 
to a remand for a hearing to determine the credibility of each of 
the ratings given. 
CONCLUSION 
The consensus medical opinion is that Rekward is physically 
incapable of returning to his former occupation. He has a high 
school education and no training nor experience for any line of 
work other than a heavy equipment operator. He will require 
vocational rehabilitation in order to return to work. The 
legislature has mandated vocational rehabilitation prior to the 
determination of permanent total disability. The purpose of the 
Workerfs Compensation Act is to provide financial means to an 
injured worker until he can regain productivity. It, therefore, 
follows that Rekward is entitled to temporary total benefits until 
he completes vocational rehabilitation. 
Rekward is also entitled to a higher rating for his cervical 
injuries, or in the alternative, is entitled to a remand for 
purposes of taking an evidentiary hearing in order to properly 
assess the credibility of the ratings given. The failure to grant 
such a hearing is a denial of a fundamental right and an abuse of 
discretion. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ d aY °f December, 1987. 
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DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Same employment. dent under 35-1-42, and heirs were precluded 
Where decedent employee of general contrac- from maintaining wrongful death action 
tor was electrocuted, allegedly through negli- against it by provisions of 35-1-60. Shupe v. 
gence of subcontractor, in accident occurring Wasatch Electric Co., Inc. (Utah 1976) 546 P 
prior to 1975 amendment of this section, sub- 2d 896. 
contractor was in same employment as dece-
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of payments — 
State average weekly wage defined. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee shall receive 66%% of that 
employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such 
disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 100% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum 
of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent 
child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent 
children, not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of 
the injury, but not to exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury over a period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee 
reaching a fixed state of recovery, and when no such light duty employment is 
available to the employee from the employer, temporary disability benefits 
shall continue to be paid. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to in chapters 1 and 2 of 
this Title shall be determined by the commission as follows: on or before June 
1 of each year, the total wages reported on contribution reports to the depart-
ment of employment security under the commission for the preceding calen-
dar year shall be divided by the average monthly number of insured workers 
determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding 
year by twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall be divided by 
52, and the average weekly wage thus determined rounded to the nearest 
dollar. The state average weekly wage as so determined shall be used as the 
basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for injuries or disabili-
ties arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination, and any 
death resulting therefrom. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917, per week from $35 to $45 in the first sentence 
§ 3137; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; 1921, ch. 67, § 1; of subsec. (1); and inserted "not to exceed the 
R.S. 1933, 42-1-61; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, average weekly wage of the employee at the 
ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-61; L. 1945, ch. 65, time of the injury" in the first sentence of 
§ 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955,
 s u b s e c ( 1 ) 
i L 5 ?' I lii*F; C ! i i ? ' Kl;}o5!\Cl\'^ § u; T h e 1 9 7 7 amendment substituted "that em-
1971, ch. 76, § 4; 1973, ch. 67, § 2; 1975, ch. ^ andJ f u T ^ f°F Wlfe ^ 
101, § 4; 1977, ch. 151, § 1; 1981, ch. 287, § 1. th* ™ d f : o f sulfec' ^' ^ „ . 
Compiler's Notes. - The 1975 amendment, T h e 1 9 8 1 amendment deleted minor before 
in subsec. (1), substituted "100%" for "662/3" "child" and "children" m the first paragraph of 
before "of the state average weekly wage" in subsec. (1); added the last paragraph in subsec. 
three places; increased the minimum benefit U); and made a minor change in style. 
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35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments — Vocational rehabilitation — Procedure 
and payments. 
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 662/3% of 
his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a depen-
dent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, 
up to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. However, 
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance 
carrier be required to pay weekly compensation payments for more than 312 
weeks. A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all 
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings 
have been had: If the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently 
and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer the employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under the 
state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of 
the commission to order paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of 
the second injury fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed 
$1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee; the rehabili-
tation and training of the employee shall generally follow the practice appli-
cable under § 35-1-69, relating to the rehabilitation of employees having com-
bined injuries. If the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state 
board of education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing 
that the employee has fully cooperated with the division of vocational rehabil-
itation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the 
employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall order that there be 
paid to the employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66%% of his average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of 
four dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the 
employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out of the second injury fund 
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with 
the time that the payments, as in this section provided, to be made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the 
employee. No employee shall be entitled to any such benefits if he fails or 
refuses to cooperate with the division of vocational rehabilitation under this 
section. 
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to bene-
fits from the second injury fund under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), including those 
injured prior to March 6,1949, shall receive not less than $120 per week when 
paid only by the second injury fund, or when combined with compensation 
payments of the employer or the insurance carrier. The division of vocational 
rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational training of the em-
ployee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is 
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qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the 
employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether the employee 
has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms, 
or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total 
and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions of 
this section and no tentative finding of permanent total disability is required 
in those instances. In all other cases where there has been rehabilitation 
effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be 
based upon partial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in 
§§ 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 
312 weeks. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 78; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 
42-1-63; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1; 
C. 1943,42-1-63; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch. 
52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 
1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch. 
71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 
1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 5; 1971, ch. 
76, § 6; 1973, ch. 67, § 4; 1974, ch. 13, § 1; 
1975, ch. 101, § 5; 1977, ch. 150, § 1; 1977, 
ch. 151, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 6; 1979, ch. 138, 
§ 2; 1981, ch. 286, § 1; 1983, ch. 356, § 1; 
1985, ch. 160, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1975 amendment 
substituted "85% of the state average weekly 
wage" for "66 2k% of the state average weekly 
wage" four times in the first paragraph and 
once in the last paragraph; increased the mini-
mum benefit per week from $35 to $45 in the 
first paragraph; inserted "not to exceed the av-
erage weekly wage of the employee at the time 
of the injury" twice in the first paragraph; in-
creased the benefit per week from $50 to $60 at 
the end of the third paragraph (deleted by the 
1977 amendment) and near the end of the 
fourth paragraph (deleted by the 1977 amend-
ment); and substituted "July 1, 1975" for "July 
1, 1974" in the fourth paragraph (deleted by 
the 1977 amendment). 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 151 substi-
tuted "spouse" for "wife" in the first paragraph. 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made 
the same changes as the 1977 amendment by 
chapter 151; combined the first two paragraphs 
into one paragraph; inserted the second para-
graph; and deleted the former third and fourth 
paragraphs which read: "Commencing July 1, 
1971, all persons who are permanently and 
totally disabled and on that date or prior 
thereto were receiving compensation benefits 
from the special fund provided for by section 
35-1-68(1) shall be paid compensation benefits 
at the rate of $60 per week. 
"Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who 
were permanently and totally disabled on or 
before March 5, 1949, and were receiving com-
pensation benefits and continue to receive such 
benefits shall be paid compensation benefits 
from the special fund provided for by section 
35-1-68(1) at a rate sufficient to bring their 
weekly benefit to $60 when combined with em-
ployer or insurance carrier compensation pay-
ments." 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 150, in the 
two paragraphs deleted by the 1977 amend-
ment by chapter 156 (quoted above) substi-
tuted "1977" for "1971" and "1975" and substi-
tuted "$75" for "$60." 
The 1979 amendment increased the mini-
mum benefit in the second paragraph from $75 
to $85. 
The 1981 amendment substituted "second in-
jury fund" for "special fund" throughout the 
section; and increased the amount in the sec-
ond paragraph from $85 to $100. 
The 1983 amendment substituted "under 
this section" at the end of the first paragraph 
for "as set forth herein"; increased the mini-
mum amount in the first sentence of the second 
paragraph from $100 to $110; and made minor 
changes in phraseology, punctuation and style. 
The 1985 amendment substituted "$120" for 
"$110" in the first sentence of the second para-
graph. 
Effective Date. — Section 2 of Laws 1985, 
ch. 160 provided: "This act takes effect upon 
approval by the governor, or the day following 
the constitutional time limit of Article VII, 
Sec. 8 without the governor's signature, or in 
the case of a veto, the date of veto override." 
Approved March 18, 1985. 
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and effect of provisions in relation to com-
pensation of physician or others rendering 
services to injured employee, 143 A. L. B. 
1264. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
"Particular cases" 
Where injured employee was bedridden 
and had lost sensation and movement of 
lower extremities because of paralysis ho 
was "particular case" under this section, 
prior to 1971 amendment, so that order 
denying application for additional medi-
cal expense was annulled since commission 
was required to ascertain whether case 
was ordinary or particular, and if it found 
case to be a particular one, it was re-
quired to determine and fix such reasona-
ble amount as under the circumstances 
would be fair and just. Sullivan v. Indus-
trial Comm., 83 U. 187, 27 P . 2d 443. 
As to whether a case was a "particular" 
one under this section, prior to 1971 
amendment, was a matter left to judg-
ment of commission, and its conclusion in 
respect thereto would not be disturbed 
unless i t appeared such conclusion was 
clearly erroneous. Buckingham Transp. Co. 
v. Industrial Comm., 93 U. 342, 72 P . 2d 
1077; Anderson v. Industrial Comm., 108 
U. 52, 157 P . 2d 253. 
35-1-82. Repealed. 
Repeal 
Section 35-1-82 (R. S. 1933, 42-1-76; L. 
1941 (1st S. S.), ch. 15, § 1; C 1943, 42-1-
76), relating to rehearing before commis-
sion, was repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 67, 
§ 3. For present provisions, see 35-1-82.53 
to 35-1-82.55. 
35-1-82.51. Hearings by commission—Notice to parties—Right of par-
ties to be present and present testimony.—Hearings shall be held by the 
commission upon reasonable notice to be given to each interested party, by 
service upon him personally or by mailing a copy to him at his last known 
post-office address. Such hearings may be adjourned from time to time in 
the discretion of the commission and may be held in such places as the 
commission shall designate. All parties in interest shall have the right to 
be present at any hearing, in person or by attorney or by any other agent, 
and to present such testimony as may be pertinent to the controversy 
before the commission and shall have the right to cross-examine. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-82.51, enacted by 
L. 1965, ch. 67, § 2. 
Title of Act. 
An act amending sections 35-1-10, 35-
1-83, 35-1-84, 35-1-85, 35-1-86, and 35-1-88, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to 
workmen's compensation and enacting new 
sections to be known as sections 35-1-82.51, 
35-1-82.52, 35-1-82.53, 35-1-82.54, 35-1-82.55, 
and 35-1-82.56, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
relating to hearings, hearing examiners, 
appeals and procedures under workmen's 
compensation and repealing section 35-1-
82, Utah Code Annotated 1953.--L. 1965, 
ch. 67. 
35-1-82.52. Hearings before commission or hearing examiner—Appoint-
ment of hearing examiners—Record of proceedings—Findings of fact and 
order.—Hearings may be held before the commission or any hearing ex-
aminer of the commission, or any commissioner as hearing examiner, when 
said commissioner has been especially appointed by the commission to hold 
any such hearing. The commission shall appoint one or more hearing exam-
iners and the commission or any hearing examiner shall have power and 
authority to call, preside at, and conduct hearings, including the power to 
issue subpoenas. A full and complete record will be kept of all proceedings 
before the commission or hearing examiner and all testimony shall be taken 
down by a reporter employed by the commission. Upon the conclusion of a 
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48-121. Compensation; schedule; total and partial disability; injury 
to specific parts of the body; amounts and duration of payments. The 
following schedule of compensation is hereby established for injuries 
resulting in disability: 
(1) For total disability, the compensation during such disability 
shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the wages received at the 
time of injury, but such compensation shall not be more than two hun-
dred dollars per week, nor less than forty-nine dollars per week; Pro-
videdy that if at the time of injury the employee receives wages of less 
than forty-nine dollars per week, then he or she shall receive the full 
amount of such wages per week as compensation. Nothing in this sub-
division shall require payment of compensation after disability shall 
cease. 
(2) For disability partial in character, except the particular cases 
mentioned in subdivision (3) of this section, the compensation shall 
be sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the difference between the 
wages received at the time of the injury and the earning power of the 
employee thereafter, but such compensation shall not be more than 
two hundred dollars per week. This compensation shall be paid dur-
ing the period of such partial disability, but not beyond three hundred 
weeks. Should total disability be followed by partial disability, the 
period of three hundred weeks mentioned in this subdivision shall be 
reduced by the number of weeks during which compensation was paid 
for such total disability. 
(3) For disability resulting from permanent injury of the following 
classes, the compensation shall be in addition to the amount paid for 
temporary disability; Provided, the compensation for temporary disa-
bility shall cease as soon as the extent of the permanent disability is 
ascertainable, viz: For the loss of a thumb, sixty-six and two-thirds per 
cent of daily wages during sixty weeks. For the loss of a first finger, 
commonly called the index finger, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of 
daily wages during thirty-five weeks. For the loss of a second finger, 
sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of daily wages during thirty weeks. 
For the loss of a third finger, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of daily 
wages during twenty weeks. For the loss of a fourth finger, commonly 
called the little finger, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of daily wages 
during fifteen weeks. The loss of the first phalange of the thumb or of 
any finger shall be considered to be equal to the loss of one half of such 
thumb or finger and compensation shall be for one half of the periods 
of time above specified, and the compensation for the loss of one half 
of the first phalange shall be for one-fourth of the periods of time 
above specified. The loss of more than one phalange shall be consid-
ered as the loss of the entire finger or thumb; Provided, that in no case 
shall the amount received for more than one finger exceed the amount 
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provided in this schedule for the loss of a hand. For the loss of a great 
toe, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of daily wages during thirty 
weeks. For the loss of one of the toes other than the great toe, sixty-six 
and two-thirds per cent of daily wages during ten weeks. The loss of 
the first phalange of any toe shall be considered equal to the loss of 
one half of such toe, and compensation shall be for one half of the peri-
ods of time above specified. The loss of more than one phalange shall 
be considered as the loss of the entire toe. For the loss of a hand, sixty-
six and two-thirds per cent of daily wages during one hundred sev-
enty-five weeks. For the loss of an arm, sixty-six and two-thirds per 
cent of daily wages during two hundred twenty-five weeks. For the 
loss of a foot, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of daily wages during 
one hundred fifty weeks. For the loss of a leg, sixty-six and two-thirds 
per cent of daily wages during two hundred fifteen weeks. For the loss 
of an eye, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of daily wages during one 
hundred twenty-five weeks. For the loss of an ear, sixty-six and two-
thirds per cent of daily wages during twenty-five weeks. For the loss 
of hearing in one ear, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of daily wages 
during fifty weeks. For the loss of the nose, sixty-six and two-thirds 
per cent of daily wages during fifty weeks. 
In any case in which there shall be a loss or loss of use of more than 
one member or parts of more than one member set forth in this subdi-
vision, but not amounting to total and permanent disability, compen-
sation benefits shall be paid for the loss or loss of use of each such 
member or part thereof, with the periods of benefits to run consecu-
tively. The total loss or permanent total loss of use of both hands, or 
both arms, or both feet, or both legs, or both eyes, or hearing in both 
ears, or of any two thereof, in one accident, shall constitute total and 
permanent disability and be compensated for according to the provi-
sions of subdivision (1) of this section. In all other cases involving a 
loss or loss of use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both 
eyes, or hearing in both ears, or of any two thereof, total and perma-
nent disability shall be determined in accordance with the facts. 
Amputation between the elbow and the wrist shall, be considered as 
the equivalent of the loss of a hand, and amputation between the knee 
and the ankle shall be considered as the equivalent of the loss of a foot. 
Amputation at or above the elbow shall be considered as the loss of an 
arm, and amputation at or above the knee shall be considered as the 
loss of a leg. Permanent total loss of the use of a finger, hand, arm, 
foot, leg, or eye shall be considered as the equivalent of the loss of such 
finger, hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye. In all cases involving a permanent 
partial loss of the use or function of any of the members mentioned in 
this subdivision, the compensation shall bear such relation to the 
amounts named in said subdivision as the disabilities bear to those 
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produced by the injuries named therein. Should the employer and the 
employee be unable to agree upon the amount of compensation to be 
paid in cases not covered by the schedule, the amount of compensa-
tion shall be settled according to the provisions of sections 48-173 to 
48-185. Compensation under this subdivision shall not be more than 
two hundred dollars per week, nor less than forty-nine dollars per 
week; Provided, that if at the time of the injury the employee received 
wages of less than forty-nine dollars per week, then he or she shall 
receive the full amount of such wages per week as compensation. 
(4) For disability resulting from permanent disability, if immedi-
ately prior to the accident the rate of wages was fixed by the day or 
hour, or by the output of the employee the weekly wages shall be 
taken to be computed upon the basis of a work week of a minimum of 
five days, if the wages are paid by the day, or upon the basis of a work 
week of a minimum of forty hours, if the wages are paid by the hour, or 
upon the basis of a work week of a minimum of five days or forty 
hours, whichever results in the higher weekly wage, if the wages are 
based on the output of the employee. 
(5) The employee shall be entitled to compensation from his or her 
employer for temporary disability while undergoing rehabilitation. 
Source: Laws 1913, c. 198, § 21, p. 586; R.S.1913, § 3662; Laws 1917, 
c. 85, § 7, p. 202; Laws 1919, c. 91, § 2, p. 228; Laws 1921, c. 
122, § 1, p. 521; C.S.1922, § 3044; C.S.1929, § 48-121; Laws 
1935, c. 57, § 41, p. 210; C.S.Supp.,1941, § 48-121; R.S.1943, 
§ 48-121; Laws 1945, c. 112, § 1, p. 357; Laws 1949, c. 160, § 1, 
p. 403; Laws 1951, c. 152, § 1, p. 617; Laws 1953, c. 162, § 1, p. 
506; Laws 1955, c. 186, § 1, p. 527; Laws 1957, c. 203, § 1, p. 
710; Laws 1957, c. 204, § 1, p. 716; Laws 1959, c. 223, § 1, p. 
784; Laws 1963, c. 284, § 1, p. 847; Laws 1963, c. 285, § 1, p. 
854; Laws 1965, c. 279, § 1, p. 800; Laws 1967, c. 288, § 1, p. 
783; Laws 1971, LB 320, § 1; Laws 1973, LB 193, § 1; Laws 
1974, LB 807, § 1; Laws 1974, LB 808, § 1; Laws 1974, LB 
710, § 1; Laws 1975, LB 198, § 1; Laws 1977, LB 275, § 1; 
Laws 1978, LB 446, § 1; Laws 1979, LB 114, § 1; Laws 1979, 
LB 358, § 1; Laws 1983, LB 158, § 1. 
Note: "This act" includes sections 48-120, 48-121, 48-157, and 48-162.01. 
1. Permanent total disability 
2. Temporary total disability 
3. Partial disability 
4. Permanent injury, specific classes 
5. Miscellaneous 
1. Permanent total disability was permanently totally disabled as a matter 
Whether a partial loss or loss of use of two °* l a w - Krijan v. Mainelli Constr. Co., 216 
members results in total and permanent dis- N e b - 1 8 6 > 3 4 2 N.W.2d 662 (1984). 
ability is to be determined in accordance &*>• employee may be totally disabled but 
with the facts. Evidence shows that plaintiff s t i11 a b l e» o n occasion, to obtain trivial 
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_ainer agreement in which the provisions of this section are specifically set out and 
ovide a copy of this agreement to the employee. The retainer agreement shall provide 
Ipace for the signature of the employee. A signed agreement shall raise a conclusive 
Resumption that the employee has read and understands the statutory fee provisions. 
jsfo fee shall be awarded pursuant to this section in the absence of a signed retainer 
gpeement. 
Subd. 10. An attorney who knowingly violates any of the provisions of this 
apter with respect to authorized fees for legal services in connection with any demand 
ade or suit or proceeding brought under the provisions of this chapter is guilty of a 
%ss misdemeanor. 
ii Subd. 11. When fees due. Attorney fees and other disbursements for a proceeding 
ader this chapter shall not be due or paid until the issue for which the fee or 
isbursement was incurred has been resolved. 
History: 1953 c 755 s 8; 1973 c 388 s 16; 1975 c 271 s 6; 1975 c 359 s 7; 1976 c 134 
f?8; 1977 c 342 s 7-11; Exl979 c3s 32; 1981 c 346 s 67-74; 1983 c 290 s 36-41; 1986 
fjfU; 1986 c 461 s 7 
f%M [Repealed, 1953 c 755 s 83] 
176.091 MINOR EMPLOYEES. 
A minor employee has the same power to enter into a contract, make election of 
remedy, make any settlement, and receive compensation as an adult employee, subject 
to the power of the commissioner of the department of labor and industry, compensa-
tion judge, or workers' compensation court of appeals to require the appointment of 
If guardian for the minor employee to make such settlement and to receive moneys 
hereunder or under an award. 
History: 1953 c 755 s 9; 1957 c 781 s 1; 1973 c 388 s 17; 1975 c 271 s 6; 1975 c 359 
WH1976 c 134 s 78 
S76.095 LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS. 
PyiThe legislature finds that workers' compensation benefits for total disabilities 
should exceed those benefits provided for partial disabilities in order to fairly compen-
|ate the person unable to engage in gainful employment or suffering an injury described 
Ipjsection 176.101, subdivision 5. It is the policy of the legislature that any change in 
|fl£(benefit schedule for total disability be accompanied by an appropriate change in 
fflg benefit schedule for partial disability. 
|li*History: 1969 c 936 s 1; 1975 c 359 s 23 
K6.10 [Repealed, 1953 c 755 s 83] 
17M01 COMPENSATION SCHEDULE. 
.Subdivision 1. Temporary total disability. For injury producing temporary total 
psability, the compensation is 66-2/3 percent of the weekly wage at the time of injury 
PG;:(1) provided that during the year commencing on October 1, 1979, and each year 
|nereafter, commencing on October 1, the maximum weekly compensation payable is 
|pe statewide average weekly wage for the period ending December 31, of the preceding 
year. 
^ (2) The minimum weekly compensation benefits for temporary total disability 
P?*" be not less than 50 percent of the statewide average weekly wage or the injured 
p?ployee's actual weekly wage, whichever is less. In no case shall a weekly benefit be 
^ s than 20 percent of the statewide average weekly wage. 
^- Subject to subdivisions 3a to 3u this compensation shall be paid during the period 
W disability, payment to be made at the intervals when the wage was payable, as nearly 
^ may be. 
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Subd. 2. Temporary partial disability. In all cases of temporary partial disability* 
the compensation shall be 66-2/3 percent of the difference between the weekly wage of 
the employee at the time of injury and the wage the employee is able to earn in the^ 
employee's partially disabled condition. This compensation shall be paid during th -^j 
period of disability except as provided in this section, payment to be made at tH? 
intervals when the wage was payable, as nearly as may be, and subject to a maximum? 
compensation equal to the statewide average weekly wage. 
Subd. 3. [Repealed, 1983 c 290 s 173] 
Subd. 3a. Economic recovery compensation. If an employee is not eligible for an, 
impairment award pursuant to subdivision 3b, then the employee shall receive ecdf 
nomic recovery compensation for a permanent partial disability pursuant to this' 
subdivision. The compensation shall be 66-2/3 percent of the weekly wage at the time* 
of injury subject to a maximum equal to the statewide average weekly wage. Fori 
permanent partial disability up to the percent of the whole body in the following* 
schedule the compensation shall be paid for the proportion that the loss of function of 
the disabled part bears to the whole body multiplied by the number of weeks aligned 
with that percent. 












The percentage loss in all cases under this subdivision is determined according to 
the rules adopted by the commissioner pursuant to section 176.105, subdivision 4. 
This subdivision applies to an injury which occurs on or after January 1, 1984. 
Subd. 3b. Impairment compensation. An employee who suffers a permanent 
partial disability due to a personal injury and receives impairment compensation under 
this section shall receive compensation in an amount as provided by this subdivision^ 
For permanent partial disability up to the percent of the whole body shown in the 
following schedule the amount shall be equal to the proportion that the loss of function 
of the disabled part bears to the whole body multiplied by the amount aligned with that 
percent in the following schedule: 
Percent of disability Amount 
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91-95 360,000 
96-100 400,000 
for all cases under this subdivision the percentage loss of function of a part of the 
MY is determined according to the rules adopted by the commissioner pursuant to 
2&ion 176.105, subdivision 4. This subdivision applies to an injury which occurs on 
||fter January 1, 1984. 
BlSubd. 3c. Maximum payable. The maximum amount payable under subdivisions 
Mtid 3b is the maximum compensation payable to an employee who has a 100 percent 
lability to the body as a whole and under no conditions shall an employee receive 
i | e than those amounts even if the employee sustains a disability to two or more body 
Subd. 3d. General. An employee who has incurred a personal injury shall receive 
Sgriorary total compensation until these benefits are no longer payable pursuant to 
m section. If the injury results in a permanent partial disability the employee shall 
Sive compensation as provided in this section. 
rSubd. 3e. End of temporary total compensation; suitable job. (a) Ninety days after 
employee has reached maximum medical improvement and the medical report 
bribed in clause (c) has been served on the employee, or 90 days after the end of an 
?oved retraining program, whichever is later, the employee's temporary total com-
ation shall cease. This cessation shall occur at an earlier date if otherwise provided 
[lis chapter. 
|£b) If at any time prior to the end of the 90-day period described in clause (a) the 
ployee retires or the employer furnishes work to the employee that is consistent with 
approved plan of rehabilitation and meets the requirements of section 176.102, 
division 1, or, if no plan has been approved, that the employee can do in the 
pfoyee's physical condition and that job produces an economic status as close as 
sible to that the employee would have enjoyed without the disability, or the 
ployer procures this employment with another employer or the employee accepts 
^ob with another employer, temporary total compensation shall cease and the 
ftqyee shall, if appropriate, receive impairment compensation pursuant to subdivi-
i%. This impairment compensation is in lieu of economic recovery compensation 
Ser subdivision 3a, and the employee shall not receive both economic recovery 
npensation and impairment compensation. Temporary total compensation and 
•airment compensation shall not be paid concurrently. Once temporary total 
npensation ceases no further temporary total compensation is payable except as 
Scally provided by this section. 
IcJ Upon receipt of a written medical report indicating that the employee has 
jned maximum medical improvement, the employer or insurer shall serve a copy 
feg/eport upon the employee and shall file a copy with the division. The beginning 
J ? 90-day period described in clause (a) shall commence on the day this report is 
j|Sd on the employee for the purpose of determining whether a job offer consistent 
R»ie requirements of this subdivision is made. A job offer may be made before the 
gToyee reaches maximum medical improvement. 
B?) The job which is offered or procured by the employer or accepted by the 
"rtoyee under clause (b) does not necessarily have to commence immediately but 
J commence within a reasonable period after the end of the 90-day period described 
aause (a). Temporary total compensation shall not cease under this subdivision 
fjhz J°b commences. 
i(c) If the job offered under clause (a) is offered or procured by the employer and 
?t the job the employee had at the time of injury it shall be offered and described 
Wing. The written description shall state the nature of the job, the rate of pay, the 
pjcal requirements of the job, and any other information necessary to fully and 
^Pfetely inform the employee of the job duties and responsibilities. The written 
Jpption and the written offer need not be contained in the same document. 
^
 e
 employee has 14 calendar days after receipt of the written description and offer 
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to accept or reject the job offer. If the employee does not respond within this perio<f 
it is deemed a refusal of the offer. Where there is an administrative conference tS 
determine suitability under subdivision 3v, or section 176.242, the period begins to riiS 
on the date of the commissioner's decision. 
(f) Self-employment may be an appropriate job under this subdivision.. 
The commissioner shall monitor application of this subdivision and may adogl 
rules to assure its proper application. 
Subd. 3f. Light-duty job prior to the end of temporary total compensation. If the3 
employer offers a job prior to the end of the 90-day period referred to in subdivision 
3e, paragraph (a) and the job is consistent with an approved plan of rehabilitation<Sr 
if no rehabilitation plan has been approved and the job is within the employee*! 
physical limitations; or the employer procures a job for the employee with another 
employer which meets the requirements of this subdivision; or the employee accept^ 
a job with another employer which meets the requirements of this subdivision, tM 
employee's temporary total compensation shall cease. In this case the employee shall 
receive impairment compensation for the permanent partial disability which is ascefi 
tainable at that time. This impairment compensation shall be paid at the same rate that 
temporary total compensation was last paid. Upon the end of temporary total compeiE 
sation under subdivision 3e, paragraph (a), the provisions of subdivision 3e or '3p 
apply, whichever is appropriate, and economic recovery compensation or impairmem* 
compensation is payable accordingly except that the compensation shall be offset b? 
impairment compensation received under this subdivision. 
Subd. 3g. Acceptance of job offer. If the employee accepts a job offer describe^ 
in subdivision 3e and the employee begins work at that job, although not necessarilv 
within the 90-day period specified in that subdivision, the impairment compensation 
shall be paid in a lump sum 30 calendar days after the employee actually commence! 
work if the employment has not been substantially interrupted by the injury for an|! 
part of the 30 days and the employee is still employed at that job at the end of t£e 
period. 
Subd. 3h. Temporary partial compensation. An employee who accepts a job unSet 
subdivision 3e or subdivision 3f and begins that job shall receive temporary partia[ 
compensation pursuant to subdivision 2, if appropriate. 
Subd. 3i. Lay off because of lack of work or released for other than seasonal 
conditions, (a) If an employee accepts a job under subdivision 3e and begins worka| 
that job and is subsequently unemployed at that job because of economic conditio^ 
other than seasonal conditions, the employee shall receive monitoring period compenj 
sation pursuant to clause (b). In addition, the employer who was the employer at the 
time of the injury shall provide rehabilitation consultation by a qualified rehabilitation 
consultant if the employee remains unemployed for 45 calendar days. The commiSj 
sioner may waive this rehabilitation consultation if the commissioner deems it appro? 
priate. Further rehabilitation, if deemed appropriate, is governed by section 176.10£ 
(b) Upon the employee's initial return to work the monitoring period begins t§ 
run. If the employee is unemployed for the reason in clause (a), prior to the end of the 
monitoring period the employee shall receive monitoring period compensation. This 
compensation shall be paid until (1) the monitoring period expires, or (2) the sum of 
monitoring period compensation paid and impairment compensation paid or payable 
is equal to the amount of economic recovery compensation that would have been paid 
if that compensation were payable, whichever occurs first. No monitoring period 
compensation is payable if the unemployment occurs after the expiration of the 
monitoring period. Monitoring period compensation is payable at the same intervals 
and at the same rate as when temporary total compensation ceased, provided that the 
minimum monitoring period compensation rate is 66-2/3 percent of the weekly wage 
for permanent partial disability as determined by section 176.011, subdivision 18 ana 
subject to the maximums specified therein. 
(c) Compensation under this subdivision shall not be escalated pursuant to section. 
176.645. 
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tif the employee returns to work and is still receiving monitoring period 
jisation, this compensation shall cease. Any period remaining in the monitoring 
jp^apon this return to work shall be used to determine further benefits if the 
^ * : is again unemployed under clause (a). 
"Upon the employee's return to work pursuant to this section the insurer shall 
he employee of the length of the employee's monitoring period and shall notify 
Ibloyee of the amount of impairment to be paid and the date of payment. 
Jbii. 3j. Medically unable to continue work, (a) If the employee has started the 
Sered under subdivision 3e and is medically unable to continue at that job because 
finjury, that employee shall receive temporary total compensation pursuant to 
jf(b). In addition, the employer who was the employer at the time of the injury 
r
'rovide rehabilitation consultation by a qualified rehabilitation consultant, 
r rehabilitation, if deemed appropriate, is governed by section 176.102. 
^Temporary total compensation shall be paid for up to 90 days after the 
; has reached maximum medical improvement or 90 days after the end of an 
[ retraining plan, whichever is later. The temporary total compensation shall 
fit any time within the 90-day period that the employee begins work meeting the 
aents of subdivision 3e or 3f. If no job is offered to the employee by the end 
|90-day period, the employee shall receive economic recovery compensation 
aat"to this section but reduced by the impairment compensation previously 
,$ by the employee for the same disability. 
ubd. 3k. Unemployment due to seasonal condition. If an employee has started 
roffered under subdivision 3e and is subsequently unemployed from that job 
\ejof the job's seasonal nature, the employee shall receive any unemployment 
ensation the employee is eligible for pursuant to chapter 268. The employee shall 
^ in addition and concurrently, the amount that the employee was receiving for 
partial disability at the time of the lay off. No further or additional 
Illation is payable under this chapter because of the seasonal lay off. 
31. Failure to accept job offer. If the employee has been offered a job under 
Eipn 3e and has refused the offer, the impairment compensation shall not be 
taTump sum but shall be paid in the same interval and amount that temporary 
Dispensation was initially paid. This compensation shall not be escalated 
jSft^ to section 176.645. Temporary total compensation shall cease upon the 
"*YS refusal to accept the job offered and no further or additional temporary total 
ation is payable for that injury. The payment of the periodic impairment 
^ ation shall cease when the amount the employee is eligible to receive under 
gsion 3b is reached, after which time the employee shall not receive additional 
Tnent compensation or any other compensation under this chapter unless the 
jre§ has a greater permanent partial disability than already compensated for. 
3m. Return to work after refusal of job offer. If the employee has refused 
^jffer under subdivision 3e and is receiving periodic impairment compensation 
prns to work at another job, the employee shall receive the remaining impair-
||pmpensation due, in a lump sum, 30 days after return to work if the employment 
'tbeen substantially interrupted by the injury for any part of the 30 days and the 
' : is still employed at that job at the end of the period. 
J £ ~ 3n. No temporary partial compensation or rehabilitation if job offer refused, 
jgployee who has been offered a job under subdivision 3e and has refused that offer 
|po subsequently returns to work shall not receive temporary partial compensa-
gwjsuant to subdivision 2 if the job the employee returns to provides a wage less 
p ? wage at the time of the injury. No rehabilitation shall be provided to this 
H™* 3o. Inability to return to work, (a) An employee who is permanently totally 
Bp, Pursuant to subdivision 5 shall receive impairment compensation as deter-
&• PUrsuant to subdivision 3b. This compensation is payable in addition to 
* . cat total compensation pursuant to subdivision 4 and is payable concurrently. 
S» case the impairment compensation shall be paid in the same intervals and 
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amount as the permanent total compensation was initially paid, and the imj)! 
compensation shall cease when the amount due under subdivision 3b is reached.* 
employee returns to work at any job during the period the impairment compeif 
is being paid, the remaining impairment compensation due shall be paid in a hj 
30 days after the employee has returned to work and no further tempor 
compensation shall be paid. 
(b) If an employee is receiving periodic economic recovery compensation^ 
determined to be permanently totally disabled no offset shall be taken against*! 
permanent total compensation for the compensation paid and no permanent 
weekly compensation is payable for any period during which economic Ve 
compensation has already been paid. No further economic recovery compensail 
payable even if the amount due the employee pursuant to subdivision 3a has B&( 
been reached. 
(c) An employee who has received periodic economic recovery compensati<jB| 
who meets the criteria under clause (b) shall receive impairment compensation^ 
ant to clause (a) even if the employee has previously received economic jecc! 
compensation for that disability. 
(d) Rehabilitation consultation pursuant to section 176.102 shall be provide! 
an employee who is permanently totally disabled. 
Subd. 3p. No job offer. Where the employee has a permanent partial disS 
and has reached maximum medical improvement or upon completion of an appro? 
retraining program, whichever is later, that employee shall receive economic rectm 
compensation pursuant to subdivision 3a if no job offer meeting the criteria of thy 
in subdivision 3e is made within 90 days after reaching maximum medical imprf 
ment or 90 days after the end of an approved retraining plan, whichever is laterU 
Temporary total compensation shall cease upon commencement of the pay 
of economic recovery compensation. Temporary total compensation shall not be! 
concurrently with economic recovery compensation. 
Subd. 3q. Method of payment of economic recovery compensation, (a) EcoHoj 
recovery compensation is payable at the same intervals and in the same amoli| 
temporary total compensation was initially paid. If the employee returns to woncj 
the economic recovery compensation is still being paid, the remaining econa 
recovery compensation due shall be paid in a lump sum 30 days after the employee^ 
returned to work if the employment has not been substantially interrupted by thejn$ 
for any part of the 30 days and the employee is still employed at that job at thej 
of the period. 
(b) Periodic economic recovery compensation paid to the employee shall Kol 
adjusted pursuant to section 176.645. 
Subd. 3r. Payment of compensation at death. If an employee receiving ecqnj^ 
recovery compensation or impairment compensation in periodic amounts dies duj 
the period from causes unrelated to the injury, the compensation shall be paid jnj 
following manner: 
(a) If the deceased employee leaves a dependent surviving spouse and no de 
dent children, as denned by section 176.111, subdivision 1, the spouse shall receive^ 
periodic economic recovery or impairment compensation that the deceased was re 
ing before the death. This compensation shall be paid for a period of up to ten ] 
after the date of death at which time payments and future entitlement to it cea 
(b) If the deceased employee leaves a dependent spouse and dependent chile 
as defined in section 176.111, subdivision 1, the periodic economic recovery or imp 
ment compensation shall continue to be paid to the surviving spouse for up to *eny|| 
after the last child is no longer dependent after which time payments andJW; 
entitlement to the compensation ceases. 
(c) If the deceased employee leaves a dependent child, as defined by ^ ^ g l 
176.111, and no dependent spouse, the periodic economic recovery or impainfl^ 
compensation shall continue to be paid to the child until the child is no lob^l 
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dent or until the amount to which the employee was entitled to receive is 
gfed, whichever is later. 
g&Payment of compensation under this subdivision shall cease prior to the end 
Ken-year periods in this subdivision if the amount to which the employee is 
Wlo receive under subdivision 3a or 3b is reached prior to the end of the ten-year 
Accept as provided in clause (c). If the deceased employee is not survived by 
lent children or a dependent spouse as defined in section 176.111, no further 
fee recovery compensation or impairment compensation is payable to any 
f I f the death results from the injury, the payment of economic recovery compen-
for impairment compensation shall cease upon the death and in lieu thereof death 
fcare payable pursuant to section 176.111. 
|bd. 3s. Additional economic recovery compensation or impairment compensa-
fto additional economic recovery compensation or impairment compensation is 
jtfto an employee who has received that compensation to which the employee is 
§1 pursuant to subdivision 3a or 3b unless the employee has a greater permanent 
^disability than already compensated. 
ubd. 3t. Minimum economic recovery compensation, (a) Economic recovery 
Insation pursuant to this section shall be at least 120 percent of the impairment 
Sisation the employee would receive if that compensation were payable to the 
>PWhere an employee has suffered a personal injury for which temporary total 
SSation is payable but which produces no permanent partial disability and the 
yci is unable to return to former employment for medical reasons attnbutable 
injury, the employee shall receive 26 weeks of economic recovery compensation, 
ilragraph shall not be used to determine monitoring period compensation under 
Jision 3i and shall not be a minimum for determining the amount of compensa-
rhen an employee has suffered a permanent partial disability. 
ubd. 3u. Medical benefits. This section does not in any way limit the medical 
tsto which an injured employee is otherwise entitled pursuant to this chapter. 
ubd. 3v. Administrative conference. The provisions of section 176.242 apply if 
exists a dispute regarding maximum medical improvement or whether the job 
9 meets the criteria under subdivision 3e or 3f. 
pod. 4. Permanent total disability. For permanent total disability, as defined 
division 5, the compensation shall be 66-2/3 percent of the daily wage at the time 
^injury, subject to a maximum weekly compensation equal to the maximum 
jf compensation for a temporary total disability and a minimum weekly compen-
^equal to the minimum weekly compensation for a temporary total disability. 
Jpmpensation shall be paid during the permanent total disability of the injured 
[yee but after a total of $25,000 of weekly compensation has been paid, the 
jrt of the weekly compensation benefits being paid by the employer shall be 
M by the amount of any disability benefits being paid by any government 
Uty benefit program if the disability benefits are occasioned by the same injury 
tones which give rise to payments under this subdivision. This reduction shall also 
ito any old age and survivor insurance benefits. Payments shall be made at the 
«us when the wage was payable, as nearly as may be. In case an employee who 
nianently and totally disabled becomes an inmate of a public institution, no 
cnsation shall be payable during the period of confinement in the institution, 
•there is wholly dependent on the employee for support some person named in 
PJ76.I l l , subdivision 1, 2 or 3, in which case the compensation provided for 
«on 176.111, during the period of confinement, shall be paid for the benefit of 
pendent person during dependency. The dependency of this person shall be 
njned as though the employee were deceased. 
?. 4a. Preexisting condition or disability; apportionment, (a) If a personal 
Results in a disability which is attributable in part to a preexisting disability that 
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arises from a congenital condition or is the result of a traumatic injury or mci 
whether or not compensable under this chapter, the compensation payable fo 
permanent partial disability pursuant to this section shall be reduced by the propo 
of the disability which is attributable only to the preexisting disability An appor 
ment of a permanent partial disability under this subdivision shall be made only i 
preexisting disability is clearly evidenced in a medical report or record made pn 
the current personal injury Evidence of a copy of the medical report or record \ 
which apportionment is based shall be made available to the employee by the emp 
at the time compensation for the permanent partial disability is begun 
(b) The compensable portion of the permanent partial disability under this set 
shall be paid at the rate at which the entire disability would be compensated bu 
the apportionment 
Subd 5 Total disability. The total and permanent loss of the sight of both 
the loss of both arms at the shoulder, the loss of both legs so close to the hips thu 
effective artificial members can be used, complete and permanent paralysis, total 
permanent loss of mental faculties, or any other injury which totally incapacitate 
employee from working at an occupation which brings the employee an mc 
constitutes total disability 
Subd 6 Minors. If any employee entitled to the benefits of this chapter 
minor or is an apprentice of any age and sustains a personal injury arising out of 
in the course of employment resulting in permanent total or a compensable perma 
partial disability, for the purpose of computing the compensation to which the emp 
ee is entitled for the injury the compensation rate for temporary total, tempo 
partial, a permanent total disability or economic recovery compensation shall be 
statewide average weekly wage 
Subd 7 [Repealed, Ex 1979c 3 s 70] 
Subd 8 Retirement presumption. For injuries occurring after the effective 
of this subdivision an employee who receives social secunty old age and survi 
insurance retirement benefits is presumed retired from the labor market This presu 
tion is rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence 
History: 1953c755sl0, 1955c615s 1-5, 1957c 781s2-5 Exl967c40s 7-11, i 
c 186 s 1, 1969 c 276 s 2, 1969 c 936 s 5-8, 1971 c 422 s 1,2, 1971 c475s 1-4, 1973 c 
s 18-20, 1973 c 600 s 1, 1973 c 643 s 1-4, 1974 c 486 s 2-4, 1975 c 271 s 6, 1975 c 
s8,23, 1976 c 134 s 78, 1977 c 342 s 12, 1977 c 347s 30, Exl979 c 3 s 33-35 1981c 
s 75, 1983 c 290 s 42-68, 1984 c 432 art 2 s 1-12, 1985 c 234 s 5-7, 1986 c 444, 19 
461 s8,9 
176.102 REHABILITATION. 
Subdivision 1 Scope. Rehabilitation is intended to restore the injured emplo 
through physical and vocational rehabilitation, so the employee may return to a 
related to the employee's former employment or to a job in another work area wl 
produces an economic status as close as possible to that the emplovee would r 
enjoyed without disability Rehabilitation to a job with a higher economic status t 
would have occurred without disability is permitted if it can be demonstrated that 
rehabilitation is necessary to increase the likelihood of reemployment Econo 
status is to be measured not only by opportunity for immediate income but alsc 
opportunity for future income 
Subd la Surviving spouse. Upon the request of a qualified dependent suiw 
spouse, rehabilitation services shall be provided through the rehabilitation sen 
section of the workers' compensation division For the purposes of this subdivi^ 
a qualified dependent surviving spouse is a dependent surviving spouse as determi 
under section 176 111, who is in need of rehabilitation assistance to become « 
supporting A spouse who is provided rehabilitation services under this subdivis 
is not entitled to compensation under subdivision 11 
Subd 2 Administrators. The commissioner shall hire a director of rehabilitat 
